• Riskope International

    Risk and Crisis Management Decision Making Support Tolerability and acceptability definition Coaching and Skills development
  • Risk and Crisis Management Decision Making Support Tolerability and acceptability definition Coaching and Skills development
  • Archive

  • Categories

  • Meta

  • Flickr Photos

    Economic downturn crisis forecast November 2008

    Contact us to know details on economic downturn crisis forecast

    graphic results of economic downturn crisis forecast November 2008

    Economic Downturn Magnitude and Duration Quantitative Study by Riskope (http://www.riskope.com), November 2008

    More Photos

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Course on Rational Risk and Crisis Management

This course is suitable for anyone who is involved in process hazards, risk quantification and preparation of 360 degrees, holistic, ISO 31000 compliant Risk Assessment for business, operations, projects. You can see the brochure and registration information here.

The methodologies introduced in this course will greatly benefit money lenders, insurers in addition to corporate managers, upper management.

You should attend if you:

  • Want to do your best to ensure your business survival by proactively managing risks and crises.

  • Want to ensure healthy coverage (as an insurance, as an insured) and money lending (as a debtor, as a lender).

  • Want to be able to understand how the situation around and inside your company evolve and want to make sure you take advantage of the opportunities that arise.

  • Care about your workers, people, society and understand that it is important to leave a legacy that is better than the one you received.

Capitalize on the expert knowledge to gain maximum value on these vital issues:

  • IDENTIFY the risks that really matter and have the potential to disrupt your business

  • CONVINCE money lenders that your business will be sustainable in a world of shrinking credits

  • DISCOVER the issues that could lead to crises possibly hampering your growth

  • PINPOINT the threat that is lurking in any commercial contract, ready to bite you

  • EXAMINE what can you do if your insurance denies your next coverage

  • ANALYZE how can you best support the next critical decision in a transparent, rational way

  • EVALUATE what you can do by yourself and what should be done by a risk consultant; as well as REALIZE what you can ask from a risk consultant and what he should deliver

  • GENERATE value and proactively defend your business by understanding your business risk and crisis landscape.

Can we stop misrepresenting reality to the public?

We gave a presentation in Toronto, at the CIM 2013 conference.

The main points made are the following:

  • You cannot manage (your) capital if you do not understand risks.
  • You will not be able to make proper decisions if you do not understand risks.
  • You will not be allowed to operate if people do not believe, trust and understand you and your risks.
  • You will miss opportunities and blindly expose yourself to risks  if you do not understand risks.
  • If you understand your risks you can go and see your bankers with better indicators than the sad, obsolete and misleading NPV.
  • With better understanding of risks you can beat insurance denial problems and come up with win-win solutions either with your insurer, or with you key contractual counterparts.
Sadly, the recent collapse of the nine-storey Rana Plaza factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, one of the worse industrial disaster in the world since the 1984 Bhopal gas explosion, confirms the above.

 

ISO 31000 IEC, ISO 31010 and Tolerability, Risk Ranking, Crisis and Reputational Impacts

If properly understood and managed, even an unexploded bomb can become an instrument for social gathering and community safety.

If properly understood and managed, even an unexploded bomb can become an instrument for social gathering and community safety.

Back in 1999, in a course we were giving on a regular basis at UBC (Continuing Education, University of British Columbia), entitled “Design of Risk Management Systems”, then in the book entitled Improving Sustainability through Reasonable Risk and Crisis Management ( A guide to Making Better Decisions ISBN 978-0-9784462-0-8we were promoting a strong linkage between Risk Management and Crisis Management as well as the need for robust, science based, risk ranking methodologies.

We spoused the principles that constitute ISO 31000 before it was written, like many serious Risk Management professionals, I am quite sure, and started reading IEC/ISO 31010 with lots of expectations.

IEC/ISO 31010 covers lots of ground indeed, including lists of available tools to identify hazards (in various contexts), determine probabilities (and their approximate distributions, if need be) and consequences of hazards. For each tool (like Monte Carlo simulation or Bayesian estimates, etc…) IEC/ISO 31010 defines applicability. Many welcomed this thorough international “house-keeping” effort, although some criticisms have been formulated, sometimes arising from very specific fields, that will most likely be covered in future editions.

From our perspective IEC/ISO 31010 has however some “shadow areas” that should be discussed:

1) Risk “tolerability/acceptability” is used, but not defined (not even a method is discussed, although historic published examples exist from various countries). This leaves the door open to major confusion and misrepresentations, inefficiencies and mitigative funds misallocation as pointed out by various authors in the last decade.
2) Risk “Ranking” is mentioned but a proper procedure is not defined. An example? In a top-ten risk list developed using common practice approaches, one will usually find high likelihood/ low consequence and low likelihood/high consequence risks mixed-up.
3) Crisis and Reputational impacts are not even referred to…despite the strong exposures these types of impact can have on the balance sheet of a corporations.
4) Complex consequences metrics needed to cover environmental, long term, etc… risks are not neither developed nor supported.

At Riskope we believe that until a code will stress these points and define proper methodologies (although it may remain a non prescriptive code like ISO 31000) we will be in a situation where a ISO compliant Risk Management approach could lead to confusion and misrepresentations with potential nefarious consequences.

What is your opinion?

Looking Back To Move Forward – The Risk Analysis Legacy of The TITANIC

Riskope thanks Evelyn Ramsey for this interesting post.

Photo Sipa Press Rex Features

The Titanic Photo: Sipa Press/Rex Features

This post is less a history of the disaster of the Titanic and more an insight into the legacy that the incident left to future risk analysis professionals. All data and information has been collected from public sources and will be identified where relevant.
The events of April 14th 1912 are infamous; the Titanic hit an iceberg on her maiden voyage and 2 hours and 40 minutes later she sank, leaving 1,503 passengers and crew dead. The unthinkable had happened to the unsinkable (it should be noted that the White Star Line company never used the ‘unsinkable’ phrase and this was later attributed to post sinking press coverage).
There are various facts that contributed to the tragic loss of life that night that could have been avoided:

  • Too few lifeboats available; only enough to accommodate 1200 passengers on a ship transporting 2200.
  • Despite warnings of potential ice flow the captain was instructed to increase speed
  • The lookout had not been provided with binoculars
  • The crew were not confident in the use of the brand new on-board wireless system

Lack of risk analysis

All of these factors are the result of money management being placed above risk analysis in the hierarchy of ship building. This was common practice in the early 1900s as competition became tight and shipping companies fought for passengers. However, the Titanic disaster led to an investigation of procedures and decision making that transformed the ship building industry and almost created the risk analysis industry overnight.
In his essay “The Titanic Disaster; An Enduring example of Money Management v Risk Management” Roy Brander (P. Eng) states that “most of the problems all came from a larger systemic problem. The owners and operators of steamships had…taken larger and larger risks to save money”. It seems barely credible today that such common sense decisions were being overridden by such purely financial reasoning.
The case of the lifeboats (or lack thereof) is the perfect of example of how the owners designed the Titanic with profit, not safety in mind. It was decided that the lifeboats took up too much deck space which – on a travelling monolith like the Titanic – was of a premium. The decision to allow passengers more space to enjoy a daily promenade or to play deck games was backed up by the fact that the regulation of lifeboats was undertaken by a committee “dominated by shipbuilders”. Lack of independent guidance with regards to such vitally important risk management decisions meant that mistakes – or even just plain bad decisions – were validated. In the aftermath of the tragedy the rules regarding lifeboat provision changed overnight. The money management based formula was immediately disposed of and a more simple idea – a seat for everyone – was introduced. This legacy of the Titanic disaster remains “never…questioned” to this day.

Concerns ignored

Other risk management concerns were swept aside by the ship’s owners. One claim was that the captain was instructed to speed through an area known for icebergs in an attempt to break existing Atlantic crossing records. The kudos of having such a record to the Titanic’s name would be worth thousands in extra bookings and so the risks of navigating through ice flow at speed were ignored.
In a bid to seem future proof the owners ensured a new wireless system was installed in time for the maiden voyage. However, due to poor training and untested procedure “not all warnings reached the bridge” and later SOS  calls from the Titanic were missed. With the vast technological advances this and last century have witnessed it seems unlikely this would happen again. What were applications only available to the military are now available to the average person, with technology and communications choices being wide and affordable. Training is also now a big part of risk analysis implementation with procedures put in place at every step to ensure mistakes are picked up immediately and resolved without delay, as well as more stringent procedures when it comes to checking new equipment and staff training.

There are a myriad of examples of how risk management was ignored in the building and execution of the Titanic in order to make a profit but the legacy of independent checks, regulation and lessons learned are still in place to this day. As Ray Brander states, the disaster “ripped away blindfolds and changed dozens of attitudes, practices and standards almost literally overnight”.
Riskope are proud to continue this code of independent risk analysis, working with businesses to make the correct decision in difficult circumstances whilst steering your projects across an ocean of uncertainties. Contact Us to discover how we can help your business navigate towards reasonable, sustainable, rational solutions compliant with your tolerability and acceptability criteria.

Riskope’s Blog 2012 in Review

The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2012 annual report for this blog.

Here’s an excerpt:

600 people reached the top of Mt. Everest in 2012. This blog got about 3,700 views in 2012. If every person who reached the top of Mt. Everest viewed this blog, it would have taken 6 years to get that many views.

Click here to see the complete report.

Arbitrary selections in Risk Management are a liability.

We can see a day when a case will be challenged in court against a company that used Probability Impact Graphs (PIGs) for their risk assessment. The questions that could be asked will be horribly embarrassing and very damaging to the PIGs’ user, as they will tend to prove that the approach constituted a professional negligence, due to the breach of Duty of Care.

Here is a preliminary list of questions that could be asked:

  1. So, on which basis did you decide that the probability of the event was “medium” (or “pink”) or whatever your PIG shows, and more importantly, why did you neglect to use any of the methods, published from the ’80s on about (subjective, expert driven) approximations of probabilities?
  2. Which is the basis for defining the consequence (loss) classes in your PIG? How did you ended up considering that 20M$ loss was worse then 5 casualties and had to be used as the driving parameter for the selection of the consequence class? Methodologies to define multi-parameter functions have been published at least since the ’80s, why didn’t you use them?
  3. Which studies did you develop to define the various classes limits of likelihood, losses? On which basis did you select those limits?
  4. Why did you limit the highest class to -x- casualties and -y- millions? What about any scenario that would overcome that value? Did you imply it does not exist?
  5. …in your statements you mentioned that PIGs correspond to State of the Art, yet we do not know any Risk Management Standard (ISO, COSO, ONR) that would formally advise to use PIGs, neither we know of any standard formal definition of PIGs, class limits, methods to define class limits.
  6. So, did you use PIGs just because every one uses them? Are you saying that PIGs are State of the Art? (NB: SoA is the highest level of development at a particular time (especially the present time); NOT what is done by the most!). PIGs are not SoA, they might be assimilated to “common practice”, or “standard practice”, BUT there is ample evidence that appeals to Common Practice constitute a fallacy: using PIGs because every body seems to do so is not a justification!
  7. Commercial PIGs software generally bear a disclaimer saying: “beware users”…this software is just a way to display an information treatment that the user produces…the software house does not bear any liability…
  8. Which criteria did you use to select the colours of your cells, which correspond to various levels of criticality? If we understand well, your criticality criteria is used as a pseudo tolerability criteria, whereby red color means highest risk, risks that should be dealt with, mitigated immediately, yellow means attention and green means “they are ok”, right? What criteria did you use to define those levels of criticality?
  9. There are tolerability criteria published since the mid ’60s. How come your color threshold does not match any known tolerability criteria, and how come that cells straddle those tolerability criteria?
  10. Using “credible scenario” is a censoring decision. How come you felt entitled to censor your analysis?
  11. Using “average p, C (loss)” is a biasing decision. How come you felt entitled to bias your analysis towards the center for each single scenario?
  12. In your opening statement you say that scenarios entering in your PIG have to be credible scenarios. What threshold to credibility did you use? How does that threshold match with your PIGs cells limits?

At the end of this drill, we doubt the user/you will be feeling in a strong position to further argue the case. We believe the user would be facing unpleasant consequences because his behavior has been negligent.

Remember, State of the Art is not what everybody does…and common practice is not an excuse, constitutes a fallacy.

Do not set yourself to be the looser by confusing “what every body does” as State of the Art.

We will soon publish a post explaining how you can avoid these pitfalls.

Risk perception, corporate prestige, psychological factors, alibi and denial.

Roughly ten years ago we were invited by a very famous and prestigious European Railways company (NB: the company name is covered by confidentiality and we have also slightly altered the story to further protect the identities of the implied parties) to give a seminar to top management.

European Railways companies are “state owned” enterprises, thus their Boards generally have CxO who either are administration veterans or politicians. Men of great experience, but traditionally poorly inclined to follow the rapid changes imposed by our fast evolving world.

The subject of the seminar was, of course, Risk Management. We were surprised that our client would be ready to part from the traditional all-hazard management, the obsolete approach inherited from the “royal rail-roads” era.

Railway, road, communication, and water supply disrupted by a land slide (natural hazard)

Railway, road, communication, and water supply disrupted by a land slide (natural hazard)

However, we learned that the “old boys” of that particular administration had either retired or were promoted to higher functions, and the new CEO, was very eager to promote “new ways”, including Risk Management, in the company. We were very honoured to have him sit in the seminar.

What Happened?

We started sharing our ideas about our numerous experiences with US and Canadian Rail-roads Risk Management, Wharves and ship loaders risk assessments, large-scale logistic risks, and country-wide approaches. Our intention was to then expand on other horizons, ending our prologue to the seminar with a panorama of strategic and tactical/operational risks before entering into rational prioritization and Risk Based Decision Making .

The CEO, however, quickly erupted with a statement that sounded roughly like: “well, I appreciate that you come from the technical side (a disdain grin appeared on his face..) and like to talk about these “technical/natural risks” (disdain again…), but we are here to hear about business risks, strategic risks, high-level understanding (happy grin, now…)…”. Believe me, if he did not use the “Black-Swan”  stereotype, it was just because no one had invented it yet! Without losing emphasis he ended-up saying that at corporate level they would like to use modern approaches (he even mentioned an off-the shelf methodology based on cards…). They were certainly not interested in knowing about “technical details” such as probabilities and consequence functions, tolerability, etc.

Our reaction was simple.

We said: “Sir, as far as we understand your company’s business is running trains; freight and passenger trains.

We understand our mission is to support your business’ objectives by bringing in good risk management and decision-making tools.

Only a rational and unbiased approach will tell which ones are the “major risks” your company is facing. Intuition is not enough, and actually, it proves generally wrong.

Risks are defined by their probabilities of occurrence and their consequences, and should be compared to your company’s tolerability for rational prioritization, and that’s way too difficult for intuition.

Without trying to expect the conclusion of the study you need to perform a ranking of your risks, we can say that the “high-level risks” you mention depend on political decisions (shall we call them political hazards?). Political decisions are slow (some might even never happen) by definition, especially when they would hit a state owned corporation. Instead, natural hazards are blind, they do not need to be re-elected, and climate is evolving faster than we might think. That’s why we believe it is not rational to exclude natural phenomena from the analyses”.

After that exchange, the CEO left, and we finished the seminar.

What Happened Next?

We knew we would never work again for that company/board/CEO.

We assumed they went shopping for a deck of cards (hopefully they were not Taro cards…) and started discussing high-level strategic risks.

Not more than six months later a landslide (a natural culprit of the “technical kind”) took away one of the major double track lines in the country, and the company was ashamed by the media as they had to shuttle people on buses around the natural phenomenon. It took roughly another year for a similar phenomenon to occur elsewhere on the network, triggered, this time, by “anomalous rainfalls”. Remember, Black Swans were not invented yet!

No need to say, no one ever called us back, but, a few weeks ago, we learned by a RfP from that country that:

a) the Ministry of Transportation had “taken away” from the rail road company their Risk Management function (a loss of freedom, like being put under monitoring by a higher authority).

b) The Ministry of Transportation had put together a Risk Management approach that goes down to the single switch, single signal, single rockfall detail at country-wide scale (so much for looking into strategic, high level risks only…NOT!). Pretty much what we had done for many other clients, but was thrown away by the CEO.

c) The Ministry of Transportation had developed a pilot study and is now in RfP phase for a custom tailored computer application at country scale.

Conclusions

So, you might ask, what are the conclusions of this story? Well, here they are, under the form of simple questions based on the verb “to lose”:

  1. Why lose ten years of precious time?

  2. Why go deep into crises, ending up losing your freedom?

  3. Why lose loads of money?

  4. Why lose your sight, blinded by irrational approaches?

When you see it written like this it sounds so simple, so easy, yet, when it comes to actually doing things, few companies, few boards of directors, few individuals actually give themselves the means to embrace rational and scientific approaches to Risk and Crisis Management using clearly defined tolerability criteria, the only way to be a winner rather than a loser…We will not discuss banks and governments, but you can see from the media, the story is perfectly mirrored in those fields as well.

Evolution

Because all of this sounds more like the result of cognitive biases, and other psychological effects  impacting the board of directors, seen as deeply interacting constellation of individuals, we have decided to team up with a specialist of systemic behavioural facilitation and we will soon offer in-house or public integrated sessions.

During these sessions Risk and Crisis Management, Risk Based Decision Making will be discussed while fostering deep understanding of the group biases and behaviour when the group is involved into decision making processes and uncertainties. The goal?

Your success, your survival, your modernization, your openness, and at the end, of course “your happiness and well-being”.

Contact Riskope to discuss the details, book a session at your HQ, or organize a public engagement. We are active world-wide and have deep understanding of cross-cultural environments.

What Fukushima (2010) nuclear accident, the Twin Towers (9/11) terror attack, deadly traffic accidents and Aquila earthquake (Italy), hurricanes have in common?

An update of Whitman’s and ANCOLD tolerability/acceptability curves (casualties from man-made or natural catastrophes, large dams failures) shows evidence for a G8-wide societal acceptability.

Comparison of the various curves, i.e.: Whitman (upper and lower), Ancold (upper and lower), 2011 Riskope's update, constant risk.

Comparison of the various curves, i.e.: Whitman (upper and lower), Ancold (upper and lower), 2011 Riskope's update, constant risk.

We have already discussed many times how well-balanced and sustainable decisions can only be taken if risks are compared to properly defined risk tolerability/acceptability criteria.

The first explicit examples of Risk Tolerability/Acceptability criteria were published in the mid-eighties by Whitman and Morgan. In more recent times the Australian National Committee on Large Dams Incorporated (ANCOLD Inc), for example, also came out with its own criteria.

In general two criteria are defined, a prudent or risk averse one, thus a low bound curve, and a risk prone aggressive, high bound curve.

Operational Risks Tolerability curves are used by Riskope (www.riskope.com ) on a routine basis to support client’s decisions at facility scale.

In our latest paper or in PDF, we built an updated curve for human losses (casualties) at country-wide scale (large-scale societal acceptability). The curve we built is not necessarily the “true” large scale acceptability, as we used a few examples of events that a) caused significant casualties, b) by the generated reactions, clearly showed the events were not tolerable in G8 countries. Furthermore, by the very nature of the considered events, our curve is not the lower bound one, but is most likely located near of just higher than the new upper bound 2011 tolerability/acceptability threshold (to be developed).

As mentioned above we used 2000-2011 events from G8 countries, Japan, USA, Italy as follows:

  • Several dozens traffic accidents casualties per week-end, several times per year, lead the Italian government to invest a large capital in a continuous real-time speed checking and enforcing system (Traffic Tutor), road safety, as the situation was intolerable.

  • A quake causing 308 casualties (Aquila), thirty years after another catastrophic one (Irpinia) lead to the conviction of a large number of public officers for mass man-slaughter and various other charges (no such reaction for the Irpinia one, thirty years before).

  • A terrorist act (9/11, New York) caused approx. 3,000 casualties and the USA “declared war on terrorism”.

  • A quake and a tsunami (Fukushima) with a wave considered to be larger than the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) have caused an evacuation zone of 20km, then 30km radius, with very large number of afflicted people (which may become ill in the future); Germany and other countries have decided to stop their nuclear energy programs, showing that the event was considered intolerable.

The following remarks can be made on the curve we generated:

  • Between 1984 Whitman lower bound and 2011 we note a clock-wise (to the right) “rotation” of the curve. This indicates that:

  • In the G8 countries, when looking at large scale catastrophes (1M casualties and more, country wide scale), societies are less tolerant than in the ’80s

  • as opposite to the prior point, when looking at events potentially generating less than 1M casualties, societies are more tolerant than in the ’80s

  • as a side note we remind that scale effects are very significant: for example, when shifting from a country wide scale to a “facility scale”, the acceptability (we are not showing that case today) is significantly lower than in 1984

  • The Whitman aggressive (upper bound) curve is nowadays in the intolerable region starting at 1,000 casualties, as opposite to being in the tolerable region below 1,000 casualties

  • When comparing the 2011 curve with a “theoretical constant risk” curve, we note they are almost parallel, meaning that one-casualty-high-probability event is as acceptable as high-casualties-low-probabilities events. Instead, Whitman lower and upper bound were “flatter” than the “theoretical constant risk”, characterising societies getting more tolerant as casualties increase and probabilities decrease.

Our clients beat the trends. We are proud to contribute to their leadership.

We have been reading with a lot of interest Deloitte’s report entitled: Tracking the trends 2011, The top 10 issues mining companies will face in the coming year.
The issues highlighted in Deloitte’s report are summarized below:

1 Financing
2 Volatility
3 Stakeholders engagement
4 Taxes, regulations and governments
5 How to invest more strategically
6 Hiring and retaining talented workers
7 Prospection (in hazardous areas from a geo-climatic-geographic and political point of view)
8 Climate change and other hazards (including regulatory hazards)
9 Infrastructure gap in the countries of operation
10 Exploring new revenues opportunities

As we were reading the report, it became quickly rather obvious that many of the points in the list above had already been covered by recent Riskope’s jobs for international clients.

This proves that our clients are clairvoyant and were “on the trends” way ahead of the pack.
That demonstrates leadership, and we are proud to contribute to our clients’ success.

To be able to brings concrete answers to our clients’ questions we had to develop unconventional and sometimes very innovative approaches, sometimes entire new methodologies.

Here is a summary of some selected jobs summaries, performed in the last few years, covering a number of the issues highlighted by Deloittes’ report.

We have been and still are performing studies related to Cyber War and Cyber Defense for military and Civilian Clients.

Financial Comparison of long term alternatives, including upside and downside risks have been performed for large environmental remediations (asbestos dump, arsenic stocks, etc.).

Alternative ways to work/process in hazardous climate and very diverse geographic areas have been studied in the field of transportation, unexploded ordnance (UXO), landmines etc.

Large multimodal transportation systems have been analyzed  with respect to climate change impacts, special hazards, including terrorism.

B2B, Corporate to Country solutions to reduce impact of seismic events, ingress/egress problems have been analyzed, prioritized, using Risk Based Decision Making (RBDM).

Cleantech solutions (disposal of waste oils, reduction of carbon footprint, alternative transportation modes, etc.) have been weighted and compared to standard solutions.

Why Legal Negligence Test is not a Critical Test for an Operation?

Even those who recognize that, in its simplest form,
Risk= (probability of a hazard occurring) x (Cost of consequences of the hazard hitting)
(Hiromitsu Kumamoto and Ernest J. Henley, Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for Engineers and Scientists, 2nd edition (New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1996), p. 2.)

and therefore a company-wide risk can be expressed as the sum of individual risks may actually incur in unfortunate misjudgments in terms of selecting where to invest their mitigative funds.
(National Bureau of Standards, Guideline for Automatic Data Processing Risk Analysis, FIPS PUB 65(Washington, DC: U.S. General Printing Office, 1979).

As a matter of fact, unfortunately, the earlier formulation has the disadvantage of being unable to distinguish between high-frequency, low-impact events and low-frequency, high-impact events. In many situations, the former may be tolerable while the latter may be catastrophic.

Ignoring the distinction may indeed put the company in a legal hazardous condition, as tort law often uses the somewhat vague standard of the “reasonable man” to judge liability of negligence (see below for definition).

As discussed in our BP case study adding to this vague standards the test of tolerability clearly brings value to the discussion and adds “foreseeability and controllability” to management.
As a matter of fact it is often impossible to act “simultaneously on all mitigations required” and it might be necessary to prove that the “efficacy and efficiency” were considered.

Let
P= Probability of injurious event
C= Gravity (Consequences) of the resulting injury
M= Burden, or cost, of adequate precautions (Mitigations)

Then
Injurer (Company) is negligent if and only if M<P x C

In other words a Company may be deemed negligent only if Mitigative moneys spent (per annum) are less than the annualized risks. Clearly transparency and rationality constitute a strong a priori defence in case something would go wrong.

Let’s look at a two summarized case studies to prove the point made in the title:

1) A tailing dam in a Canadian mine in Manitoba was assessed with a likelihood of failure of 10-5 per annum. After an interview with the personnel, we defined a costs of consequences within a 95% confidence level to 10 millions dollars. By strict application of the negligence criteria, the company would be considered negligent if and only if they spend less than 100 dollars for mitigative measures per year. Of course the company would be the object of intense media and regulatory scrutiny should an accident occur. Even if the company is spending way above the threshold value it is difficult to imagine it would emerge unscathed from such a failure proving the point of the title.

2) In the Andes, a bus fleet shuttles the mine’s employees to different locations. After 10 years of regular services, a tragic accident took two lives. As management grew afraid of a crisis potentially ending into massive strikes, they asked Riskope to study possible alternatives to the system. The review of existing road safety measures revealed that one millions dollars had already been invested in additional guard rails and buses were escorted, requiring an operational budget of 150 thousand dollars per year. For 10 years of operation it can then be said that the company was spending 0.25 millions dollars per year in mitigative measures. Now, let’s assume that the probability of an accident is 0.001, an extremely high value, per year. A careful reader will indeed note that this value is absurdly high (for reference, in France or Switzerland where we have a strong data set, the value would be at least 2 orders of magnitude lower). The company would therefore be considered negligent if and only if the cost of consequences associated to that probability is 250 millions dollars or more. This staggering value overcomes any accident scenario involving the shuttle buses. Consequently the company would not be considered negligent in the eye of the law. In the eye of the public and employees, however, it would most likely be a completely different story… but experience has shown that public outcry only explodes when a number of similar accidents occur delivering the impression that public is exposed to an epidemic.

In conclusion we have shown that the legal negligence test is not a critical factor for an operation’s safety, health and risk and crisis management, but constitute a bare minimum . The negligence test is not an end, but only the start of a continuous process.

 

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,989 other followers

%d bloggers like this: