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    Economic downturn crisis forecast November 2008

    Contact us to know details on economic downturn crisis forecast

    graphic results of economic downturn crisis forecast November 2008

    Economic Downturn Magnitude and Duration Quantitative Study by Riskope (http://www.riskope.com), November 2008

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Can we stop misrepresenting reality to the public?

We gave a presentation in Toronto, at the CIM 2013 conference.

The main points made are the following:

  • You cannot manage (your) capital if you do not understand risks.
  • You will not be able to make proper decisions if you do not understand risks.
  • You will not be allowed to operate if people do not believe, trust and understand you and your risks.
  • You will miss opportunities and blindly expose yourself to risks  if you do not understand risks.
  • If you understand your risks you can go and see your bankers with better indicators than the sad, obsolete and misleading NPV.
  • With better understanding of risks you can beat insurance denial problems and come up with win-win solutions either with your insurer, or with you key contractual counterparts.
Sadly, the recent collapse of the nine-storey Rana Plaza factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, one of the worse industrial disaster in the world since the 1984 Bhopal gas explosion, confirms the above.

 

Non esiste progresso senza errori

Riskope ringrazia Luca Calderan per questo suo contributo.

Il successo è la capacità di passare da un fallimento all’altro senza perdere l’entusiasmo.” (Success is the ability to go from one failure to another with no loss of enthusiasm)

 Winston Churchill

 Con queste parole si potrebbe cominciare il ragionamento di oggi su un argomento che è spesso fonte di angoscia e di vergogna nel panorama italiano: la possibilità di sbagliare e l’importanza dell’errore.

 Spesso vi è infatti una credenza diffusa e generata dalla paura di affrontare i dati reali che spinge a trattare gli errori come se si potessero combattere con un incantesimo, capace di tenerli alla larga dall’azienda o dal settore di riferimento.

Un altro problema è che spesso gli errori sono estrinseci e radicati, al punto da essere diventati prassi di cui nessuno ricorda l’origine, ma che vengono portati avanti perché “si è sempre fatto così”.

Cìò può essere comprensibile in un panorama fatto di frammentazione e di aziende dimensione medie o piccole, spesso in competizione tra loro e quindi ben lontane da un’analisi di mercato globale che consenta di capire le logiche e di inserirsi in modo innovativo.

Tuttavia questo non è vero per tutte le aziende e negli ultimi anni si è vista la capacità di alcune start-up, libere dai vincoli del passato e concentrate unicamente sul far bene nel proprio settore concentrandosi sulle proprie capacità, che hanno saputo conquistarsi anche importanti parti di mercato.

Come spesso accade però basta guardare ai cugini anglosassoni per vedere che questo modo di vedere era già in atto anni fa e probabilmente anche in molte aziende italiane, che però spesso hanno col tempo dimenticato la propria vision.

Ad esempio nel 1966 un ingegnere britannico, di nome Pugsley, ha dichiarato che “una professione che non fa errori è una professione che non progredisce”.

Spesso infatti quello che a prima vista appare come un errore potrebbe diventare un modo alternativo di vedere i processi aziendali o di affrontare la situazione in un contesto mutato, che può aver trasformato i vecchi “errori” in soluzioni vincenti.

Questo è ovviamente un paradosso ma può essere utile per mostrare la necessità di cambiare alcuni degli elementi con cui siamo soliti valutare l’economia e lo stato di salute delle aziende.

Gli elementi dell’economia classica consentono infatti un’analisi “perfetta” basata su modelli statici, ma gli eventi degli ultimi anni ci hanno mostrato come cambiamenti (talvolta globali) possano avere effetti devastanti e provenienti da campi che si tendeva a sottovalutare.

Passando ai giorni nostri si può notare come Tata Motors avesse inventato il programma “Dare to Try”, segnalato anche su Sunday Times, per stimolare i dipendenti ad essere innovativi e premiare anche gli errori, perché magari da lì si sarebbero potute trovare soluzioni innovative e magari risolvere poi problemi strutturali.

Ratan Tata, l’ex presidente del gruppo era solito dire che i fallimenti sono come una miniera d’oro per una società.

Oggi molte grandi aziende, anche sul territorio italiano, hanno capito l’importanza di ascoltare il personale, nella segnalazione di proposte di miglioramento, che è un modo elegante per descrivere gli errori di organizzazione per poter porre in atto strategie mirate.

L’unica cosa da tener presente è di saper inserire una corretta analisi del rischio, che permetta di capire quanto l’errore possa incidere realmente sull’andamento dell’azienda o sul lancio di un prodotto nuovo.

Perciò non abbiate paura di sbagliare, perché solo così si può recuperare la capacità di osare che è un elemento necessario per competere, progredire ed eccellere.

E per chiudere può venirci in aiuto una citazione da un altro presidente americano:

È molto meglio osare cose straordinarie, vincere gloriosi trionfi, anche se screziati dall’insuccesso, piuttosto che schierarsi tra quei poveri di spirito che non provano grandi gioie né grandi dolori, perché vivono nel grigio e indistinto crepuscolo che non conosce né vittorie né sconfitte.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

No failures, no progress.

A British engineer, named Pugsley, said in 1966 that “a profession that does not make mistakes is a profession that does not progress” (Pugsley A.G. 1966, The Safety of Structures, Edward Arnold Publishing ltd, London). In his pioneering book on the safety of structures, Pugsley related that fighter pilots in WWII went up against the enemy even when there was a high chance of being shot down. However, the same pilots demanded design changes if the structural failure rate of their aircraft was more than 5/100,000 per flying hour.

Almost half a century later later, large companies (Tata Group for example, India’s largest conglomerate) reportedly hand out an annual “Dare to Try” Prize for “the best failed idea”.

Ratan Tata, the former chairman of the group used to say that failures are like a gold mine for a company. We would add absolutely, yes, and it has been so since Humans started to wander around and feed on unknown plants and fruits, tried to build a fire.

Tata is not alone. Since the ’90s Eli Lilly, a large drug maker, similarly organizes “failure parties”.

Both these companies and other that follow similar paths have understood Pugsley’s message and that innovation cannot occur without failures.

No failures, no progress.

Success and failure are equally important learning experiences, provided they do not “kill” you or your organization, hence the necessity to “properly measure” the risks before jumping in.

That’s where risk management fits in the context of innovation.

Maths make things simpler, rather than more complicated, bring clarity.

A discussion on LinkedIN entitled “Does anyone use Standard Deviation, Variance or similar measures to prioritise risks” prompted a reply we are now posting on the blog for our interested readers.

It’s a bit technical, but it shows that maths make things simpler, rather than more complicated, bring clarity!

Talking about clarity, let’s remember that the context of most of our work at Riskope is in downside risk, in various industries. When we refer below to “Consequences”, we are referring to the “sum” of many components including, for example: replacement cost, Business interruption, loss of market share, reputation, legal costs, crisis cost (boycotts, protests…), etc.

As many pointed out in the LinkedIN discussion, both probability and consequences are actually stochastic (random) within a population of scenarios (careful not to “sample” different populations with the excuse of simplifying the problem). Both vary between a Min and a Max, with a certain expected value Ave, and a standard deviation St.

Oh, by the way, some may even point out that p,C are not necessarily independent variables, but let’s not go there this time around for the sake of space.

Thus R= p * C holds, with p, C and, as a result, R being stochastic (random) variables. Thus R will have a Min and a Max, Ave and a standard deviation St and it will be possible to evaluate the probability that R is larger than a given value, or what is the value that has a x% probability of exceedance.
More importantly, as we do on a daily basis in ORE applications (Optimum Risk Estimates), we can compare probabilistically the risk to the client’s tolerability threshold (another chapter we will leave aside for obvious space limitations).

To do that all of the above we need to calculate R.
Now, let’s make sure we do not use a bazooka to shoot a mosquito here, with all its unpleasant side effects!

Monte Carlo simulation would work provided we know with good approximation Min, Max, Ave, St of p and C. We believe that in most cases we could all convince ourselves we have a grasp of Min, Max and Ave, but frankly St is a difficult one.
Furthermore, Monte Carlo will require that you define the distribution (type) of p,C…and there we are in uncharted territory.

Information theory says that if we do not know (very well) what type a distribution belongs to, we minimize the errors on the estimates by keeping it simple! Some authors, even go so far as to say that you are better off selecting a UNIFORM (yes, you read well) distribution if you are not sure of the type.

Now, using Monte Carlo to calculate R as a product of two uniform distribution is really using a space ship to go buy your candies at the shop next door.

Below we are showing the super simple, analytic solution for the case where p and C are symmetric distributions (of any type) developing respectively between pMin =CMin =nil and a maximum value pMax, CMax.
Of course the case where pMin = a, CMin= b would also be very easy to derive.

Because both distributions are symmetric their averages are respectively

E(p)= pMax /2;
E(C)= CMax /2.

Risk R= p*C, so Ave (R), is immediately found as follows:

Ave(R) = Ave(p) * Ave(C)= (pMax * CMax)/4;

It can be seen that the average risk is four times smaller than the maximum risk, for any shape of symmetric distributions going from nil to Max.

A slightly more complicated direct formula leads to St(R).
Job done!

Now we can calculate any probability of exceedence you’d like by creating an empirical distribution of R with Min(R), Max(R), Ave(R), St(R).

Why would one use Monte Carlo and make the collateral damage of increasing the errors?

If this type of maths intimidates you, there is another approach we often use at Riskope: we consider several sub-cases of a scenario with point estimates of p-C and we “lump them up” in a “risk bubble”. We have a number of slideshows you can access from our blog that display such “risk-bubbles”.

Furthermore, if you really believe you have a grasp on the dissimetry of the p,C distribution, then you could use other direct approximations as well, still leaving the Monte Carlo bazooka to rest.

From Bottle to Throttle: risks to the aviation industry from chemical dependency

Riskope thanks Evelyn Ramsey for this interesting post.

Worldwide, the aviation industry is one of risk management, health and safety. This global industry operates in an environment of extreme caution. Notwithstanding this, there have been approximately 150 cases of intoxicated pilots which have come to light over a period of 12 years.

As recently as last month, an American Airlines pilot was arrested as he was conducting pre-flight checks, preparing to fly 53 passengers from Minneapolis St Paul International Airport to New York City La Guardia Airport. Officers had been alerted by allegations that a strong smell of alcohol was emanating from him. They required him to take a breathalyzer test, which he failed. In Minneapolis, the limit is 0.04 of breath alcohol concentration which is much stricter than the limit for road users.

Not just alcohol.

There have also been cases of drug taking by aircraft crew. In 2011, the pilots and flight attendants on Russian airline Yakutia were accused of smoking marijuana immediately prior to boarding a plane for flight. This was investigated and the flight of 192 passengers was delayed for half a day before a new crew could be found to take control.

It is not only alcohol and illegal drugs which create risks. Addiction to prescription drugs can also raise issues of risk for airline personnel. These, though, are much harder to detect.

Most airline companies will have their own policies on substance abuse in addition to the requirements of international regulation. These policies tend to concern the use of alcohol and other substances within a given time relative to the flight. They are known as ‘bottle to throttle’ policies. Canadian Aviation Regulations are strict.

Aviation accidents which occur as a result of drink or drugs abuse are, however, rare. In spite of the media coverage which arises when a pilot fails a breathalyzer test, professionals within the industry are very aware of the cost – both financial and human – of a disaster happening. This is down to training and rigorous policies.

Sound risk management

In the US, studies have been conducted on pilots operating under the influence of alcohol. The National Transportation Safety Board is unaware of any US airline accident involving pilots under the influence and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts some 10,000 to 11,000 random alcohol tests annually. That would cover approximately ten percent of all US airline pilots. Putting it into perspective, each year, only a handful of pilots are arrested for exceeding the alcohol limit compared with 1.5 million drivers.

Aviation drug and alcohol policy is determined at three levels:

  • international
  • national
  • airline.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) determines common international requirements. This covers a wide range of issues and includes the requirement that aircraft maintenance personnel, air traffic controllers and flight crew have no established history of alcohol or drugs abuse. The Canadian Transportation Agency is the overarching body in Canada.

It is clear that it is important for all companies to have a substance abuse policy: not only to protect the position of the employer but also to support the employee. What is also clear is that most airlines will have developed policies based on, among other things:

  • their legal responsibilities
  • expressing commitment to health and safety
  • raising awareness  among staff of the commercial imperatives
  • making the position of staff who do abuse substances clear.

In any risk management scenario, there is also a place for remedial action. Within the aviation industry there is a growing movement to support pilots and flight attendants who have developed a substance dependency problem.  The US-based Aviation Family Fund is an organisation set up for aviation families affected by chemical dependency. There are other agencies which are specifically committed to treating those with a dependency on prescription drugs. Support of this nature is down to location and individual airline, but over the past ten years the US has developed a scheme where a pilot with a substance abuse problem can come forward without fear of job loss. This may be a breakthrough step in managing risk and is certainly worthy of further study.

ISO 31000 IEC, ISO 31010 and Tolerability, Risk Ranking, Crisis and Reputational Impacts

If properly understood and managed, even an unexploded bomb can become an instrument for social gathering and community safety.

If properly understood and managed, even an unexploded bomb can become an instrument for social gathering and community safety.

Back in 1999, in a course we were giving on a regular basis at UBC (Continuing Education, University of British Columbia), entitled “Design of Risk Management Systems”, then in the book entitled Improving Sustainability through Reasonable Risk and Crisis Management ( A guide to Making Better Decisions ISBN 978-0-9784462-0-8we were promoting a strong linkage between Risk Management and Crisis Management as well as the need for robust, science based, risk ranking methodologies.

We spoused the principles that constitute ISO 31000 before it was written, like many serious Risk Management professionals, I am quite sure, and started reading IEC/ISO 31010 with lots of expectations.

IEC/ISO 31010 covers lots of ground indeed, including lists of available tools to identify hazards (in various contexts), determine probabilities (and their approximate distributions, if need be) and consequences of hazards. For each tool (like Monte Carlo simulation or Bayesian estimates, etc…) IEC/ISO 31010 defines applicability. Many welcomed this thorough international “house-keeping” effort, although some criticisms have been formulated, sometimes arising from very specific fields, that will most likely be covered in future editions.

From our perspective IEC/ISO 31010 has however some “shadow areas” that should be discussed:

1) Risk “tolerability/acceptability” is used, but not defined (not even a method is discussed, although historic published examples exist from various countries). This leaves the door open to major confusion and misrepresentations, inefficiencies and mitigative funds misallocation as pointed out by various authors in the last decade.
2) Risk “Ranking” is mentioned but a proper procedure is not defined. An example? In a top-ten risk list developed using common practice approaches, one will usually find high likelihood/ low consequence and low likelihood/high consequence risks mixed-up.
3) Crisis and Reputational impacts are not even referred to…despite the strong exposures these types of impact can have on the balance sheet of a corporations.
4) Complex consequences metrics needed to cover environmental, long term, etc… risks are not neither developed nor supported.

At Riskope we believe that until a code will stress these points and define proper methodologies (although it may remain a non prescriptive code like ISO 31000) we will be in a situation where a ISO compliant Risk Management approach could lead to confusion and misrepresentations with potential nefarious consequences.

What is your opinion?

Looking Back To Move Forward – The Risk Analysis Legacy of The TITANIC

Riskope thanks Evelyn Ramsey for this interesting post.

Photo Sipa Press Rex Features

The Titanic Photo: Sipa Press/Rex Features

This post is less a history of the disaster of the Titanic and more an insight into the legacy that the incident left to future risk analysis professionals. All data and information has been collected from public sources and will be identified where relevant.
The events of April 14th 1912 are infamous; the Titanic hit an iceberg on her maiden voyage and 2 hours and 40 minutes later she sank, leaving 1,503 passengers and crew dead. The unthinkable had happened to the unsinkable (it should be noted that the White Star Line company never used the ‘unsinkable’ phrase and this was later attributed to post sinking press coverage).
There are various facts that contributed to the tragic loss of life that night that could have been avoided:

  • Too few lifeboats available; only enough to accommodate 1200 passengers on a ship transporting 2200.
  • Despite warnings of potential ice flow the captain was instructed to increase speed
  • The lookout had not been provided with binoculars
  • The crew were not confident in the use of the brand new on-board wireless system

Lack of risk analysis

All of these factors are the result of money management being placed above risk analysis in the hierarchy of ship building. This was common practice in the early 1900s as competition became tight and shipping companies fought for passengers. However, the Titanic disaster led to an investigation of procedures and decision making that transformed the ship building industry and almost created the risk analysis industry overnight.
In his essay “The Titanic Disaster; An Enduring example of Money Management v Risk Management” Roy Brander (P. Eng) states that “most of the problems all came from a larger systemic problem. The owners and operators of steamships had…taken larger and larger risks to save money”. It seems barely credible today that such common sense decisions were being overridden by such purely financial reasoning.
The case of the lifeboats (or lack thereof) is the perfect of example of how the owners designed the Titanic with profit, not safety in mind. It was decided that the lifeboats took up too much deck space which – on a travelling monolith like the Titanic – was of a premium. The decision to allow passengers more space to enjoy a daily promenade or to play deck games was backed up by the fact that the regulation of lifeboats was undertaken by a committee “dominated by shipbuilders”. Lack of independent guidance with regards to such vitally important risk management decisions meant that mistakes – or even just plain bad decisions – were validated. In the aftermath of the tragedy the rules regarding lifeboat provision changed overnight. The money management based formula was immediately disposed of and a more simple idea – a seat for everyone – was introduced. This legacy of the Titanic disaster remains “never…questioned” to this day.

Concerns ignored

Other risk management concerns were swept aside by the ship’s owners. One claim was that the captain was instructed to speed through an area known for icebergs in an attempt to break existing Atlantic crossing records. The kudos of having such a record to the Titanic’s name would be worth thousands in extra bookings and so the risks of navigating through ice flow at speed were ignored.
In a bid to seem future proof the owners ensured a new wireless system was installed in time for the maiden voyage. However, due to poor training and untested procedure “not all warnings reached the bridge” and later SOS  calls from the Titanic were missed. With the vast technological advances this and last century have witnessed it seems unlikely this would happen again. What were applications only available to the military are now available to the average person, with technology and communications choices being wide and affordable. Training is also now a big part of risk analysis implementation with procedures put in place at every step to ensure mistakes are picked up immediately and resolved without delay, as well as more stringent procedures when it comes to checking new equipment and staff training.

There are a myriad of examples of how risk management was ignored in the building and execution of the Titanic in order to make a profit but the legacy of independent checks, regulation and lessons learned are still in place to this day. As Ray Brander states, the disaster “ripped away blindfolds and changed dozens of attitudes, practices and standards almost literally overnight”.
Riskope are proud to continue this code of independent risk analysis, working with businesses to make the correct decision in difficult circumstances whilst steering your projects across an ocean of uncertainties. Contact Us to discover how we can help your business navigate towards reasonable, sustainable, rational solutions compliant with your tolerability and acceptability criteria.

Riskope 5 day course on Risk and Crisis Management for top managers and key personnel.

Riskope were recently asked to provide a comprehensive five day course addressing Risk and Crisis Management, Risk Based Decision Making, Project Evaluation for top managers and key personnel at Investment Banks, Oil & Gas, Energy and Transportation.
Although companies willing to commit the resources for a five-day intensive courses remain limited, we felt like it would be a good idea to share the program with our readership, as an example.

A course for decision-makers, key personnel, CxOs in any industry, any country

A course for decision-makers, key personnel, CxOs in any industry, any country

Of course our courses are scalable, from a couple hours up to this exhaustive review and custom tailored courses can be set-up by selectively picking the themes that most interest you/your organization. You can download the example file here.

Contact us today to discuss your custom made in-house Risk and Crisis Management, Risk Based Decision Making, Project Evaluation! Armed with the skills you will learn from Riskope you will have a competitive edge on your competitors, your ideas will be more defensible and sustainable, and your chances of success will multiply.

Insurance Denial not Only for Mining, but also for Residential and Private Parties?

At Riskope we have been writing and discussing insurance denial issues hitting miners around the world since 2009.

Flooded Gas Station

Flooded Gas Station

Now there is evidence that the problem is extending to flood insurance (and most certainly to other natural hazard-linked events in the future).

Seen from a societal risk management point of view the problem is quite intriguing:

1) Governments (at all level, from Central to Municipalities) have allowed residential development of areas that were already, or may become (because of climate change) hazardous (at higher frequency than “calm” areas). Reasons for those decisions vary from demographic pressure (need to find a place for people to settle) to “business like” (more people means more income taxes, more employment, etc.)
2) People have gladly gone into “hazardous” area unknowingly, or because they were affordable.
3) Insurances were happy to insure, as it meant more business. In some cases they established “agreements” with the government, as they were almost replacing a “public service”.

Whatever the reasons and the history, now insurers are finding themselves overexposed, governments cannot offer that “public service” (people in “calm” areas would not agree to “pay for the others”) and people in the hazardous area demand safety, rescue and support.

Three actors, three sets of “historic reasons”, three sets of diverging interests.

Any ideas and comments?

Cree valor en su empresa minera por medio de una integración estratégica de conocimiento y escenarios de riesgos con Estimaciones óptimas de riesgo (ORE)®

La gestión de riesgos mineros solía ser una cuestión de “conformidad” o de “minimización de pérdidas”, algo en lo que se pensaba después, no una herramienta para crear valor en la mineria.

Tanque de relaves en los trópicos. No es muy lindo a ver, ma cuales son los riesgos?

Tanque de relaves en los trópicos. No es muy lindo a ver, ma cuales son los riesgos?

Las mineras interpretaban los resultados de las Evaluaciones de Riesgos con Gráficos de Impacto Probabilístico (pérdidas) confusos (conocidos como PIG), que a menudo eran engañosos y que en realidad no promovían ni incrementaban una comprensión holística del ambiente de negocios y de los tanques de relaves/colas. Cree valor en su minera por medio de una integración estratégica de conocimiento y escenarios de riesgos con Estimaciones óptimas de riesgo (ORE)® . Riskope tiene una preparación académica única y experiencia en investigación y aplicación de evaluación de riesgos a nivel mundial implementando ORE. Las ORE son el resultado de veinte años de experiencia en el mundo entero y han sido desarrolladas para diversos clientes, incluyendo algunos de Fortune 500, en varias etapas, como adquisiciones, pre-factibilidad, operaciones y cambios. Mire la presentación aquí.

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